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Law and the Dilemma of Stability and
Change in the Modernization Process
Lucian W. Pye*
It is a signal honor to be invited to participate in these ceremonies
of dedication. The vigor of dynamic growth at this most distinguished
center of legal thought and training can provide reassurance to all who
believe deeply in the central place of law in American democracy.
I must confess a sense of uneasiness and humility in addressing this
distinguished gathering. In part I am humbled by being the political
scientist, the amateur observer of governmental processes, confronting
the legal community, the professionals of the processes of rule. As a
political scientist my confidence has been constantly challenged by
the regularity with which our graduate training programs lose out to
the law schools in our competition for the brightest young men interested in public affairs. I cannot resist adding that I profoundly hope
that in winning so many of these eager minds you appreciate the great
responsibility you have to stimulate with ever more imaginative and
intellectually challenging programs of education.
In addressing this audience I am further humbled by the fact that
even as a political scientist I am not personally a student of constitutional law or legal philosophy. Even as a student of comparative
politics my interests have led me more to analyzing the newly developing countries, countries which often appear to be impervious to
principles about the rule of law.
Out of this awareness of my limitations for this occasion, I have
chosen as my theme what I feel to be a significant paradox about the
role of law in the modernization process which is now engrossing the
energies of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East. Boldly stated, this paradox is that historically, when
Western law was introduced into traditional societies with the intent
of providing political order and stability, the consequence was always
revolutionary social changes and tensions. Yet in the post-colonial era,
when government policies have often been to accelerate social change,
the weight of law has been that of a restraining and stabilizing force.
The difficulty seems to have been that in neither case were law,
public administration, and the political process integrated as a part of
a coherent system of social behavior. In the colonial environment
law was coupled with administration, but the two realms of governo
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ment were not related to a broad polity rooted in the general society.
In the post-colonial period efforts to bring together the political life
of a people and the operations of governmental administrations have
not been outstandingly successful; indeed, such efforts seem often to
have created tensions that weakened the links between law and public
administration.
From these rather abstract generalizations we may conclude that if
law is to perform a rational and constructive role in the relationship
between order and change the law, public administration, and the
polity of the society must fit together as a functionally interrelated
system, in which each component preserves its own integrity.
Let me quickly add that by imposing upon you this degree of
abstraction, I have taken a calculated risk of taxing to the limit your
spirit of courtesy and hospitality. I want therefore to turn to more
concrete matters and to try to illustrate my conclusions on the basis of
the historical record.
I. LAW AND THE WESTERN IMPACr ON AsIA AND AFRICA
There are many themes available for telling the extraordinarily complex story of the diffusion of Western civilization throughout the world
and the establishment of the era of Western colonialism. We might
speak of motivating forces such as the thrill of adventure or the urge
to share religious insights and to propagate doctrines, as well as all
the basic and base human sentiments ranging from the quest for glory
to avariciousness. Fundamental among all these themes would be the
persisting demand by European civilization that human relations, and
more particularly the management of disputes, should fall under explicit and universally-based laws.
As Europeans moved restlessly into the non-Western world-as
traders and merchants, missionaries and adventurers-they carried with
them the expectation that all societies should properly be organized
as states possessing attributes of sovereignty and adhering to rules of
law. Wherever the European went, one of his first revealing queries
was, "Who is in charge here?" According to the logic of the European
mind, every territory should fall under some sovereignty and all people
in the same geographic location should have a common loyalty and
the same legal obligations. Also, in these early clashes of culture the
European response was to search for legal redress, and the absence of
a recognizable legal order must have made life uncomfortable for these
early Europeans.
If we focus our attention on the sequence of incidents which led to
the establishment of any particular colonial system we are able to see
the extent to which the European was driven to make commitments
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and demands of all kinds because of his notions about the proper place
of law in the general scheme of things.
For example, in the nearly three hundred years it took to establish
their ultimate administrative empire in Indonesia, the Dutch
constantly pressed for the creation of a legal order which would be
consistent with that they knew in Europe. They were willing to allow
traditional forms of authority to remain but steadfastly demanded that
such authorities act according to a legal order. When the Dutch East
India Company was first established in Java in 1619, it sought to establish a base at Batavia which would permit trading in an environment
governed by law. Although in every other respect the environment
at Jactra was most inhospitable to enterprise and modernization, once
the conditions of law and order were met the physical obstacles of
steaming swamplands and rampant malaria did not deter the rapid
growth of Batavia, which today, as Jakarta, is the largest city in Southeast Asia. As the Dutch moved across Java they had to develop
working relations with a large array of sultans and local potentates,
each with his own tradition of rule and custom of authority. In each
locale the Dutch insisted upon the recognition of certain principles of
universal law even while supporting parochial, historical forms of rule.
By 1830, when Dutch administrative control blanketed all of Java,
they had created an extraordinary patchwork of local rulers and direct
company-administered areas. The common element throughout this
system was the notion that government should be related to law, and
that administration should be premised upon an explicit legal order.
Relations between the British East India Company and local rulers,
first in India and then in Malaya, followed very much the same
pattern. Certainly one of the dynamic factors in the clash between
Western traders and Chinese mandarins which accompanied the
opening of China was this same persistent Western belief that human
affairs can be satisfactorily carried out only under a rule of law. If we
were to elaborate upon the events which took place in Canton, or the
encounters between the British and Chinese which led to the Opium
Wars, or the first encounters between Westerners and the Burmese and
Siamese kingdoms, we could readily demonstrate this constant ingredient of the West's feelings about law.
LAw, ADMImISTRATIoN, AND NATION-BUILDING
In tracing the story down through the colonial period to the current
era of concern for the development of the newly emergent nations, we
can observe that these sentiments about law have dominated not just
the beginnings of the diffusion of Western culture but the entire
history of Western thought about nation-building and political deII.
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velopment. Before turning to an analysis of the role of Westernized
law under colonialism, however, it may be helpful to take a quick
overview of Western thinking about national development.
As we suggested, the initial Western reaction to the non-Western
world was the belief that the essential prerequisite for transforming
traditional societies into nation-states was the establishment of codified
legal systems. The demand for extraterritorial rights in such countries
as China, Japan, and Ottoman Turkey reflected this belief that the
critical difference between the modern state and traditional systems
of authority was the existence of a universalistic legal system. Presumably, once it was possible to give up the necessity of extraterritoriality in a country, that government could be welcomed into the
family of nations as a modern state possessing the full attributes of
sovereignty.
Gradually, however, the Westerner learned that in order to change
a traditional order into a modern state more than just a legal system
was needed. If social and economic intercourse were to be conducted
in an orderly fashion, if life was to be made more predictable, and if
disputes were to be more effectively managed-that is, if the beneficial
effects of a rule of law were to be realized-it would be necessary to
supplement legal systems with the powers and authority of rational
administration. Law requires order, and a legal system needs the
backing of a civil administrative system.
Thus from this insistence that local Asian and African potentates
and rulers introduce formal legal processes evolved patterns of indirect
rule under which Westerners sought to provide traditional authorities
with the benefits of modern bureaucracies. Indeed, throughout the
colonial period modernization, progress, and the building of nations
was conceived of mostly in terms of the development of two prerequisites-law and administration. Whether champions of the White Man's
Burden, hardheaded traders, missionaries, or liberal idealists, all agreed
that social and political advancement were substantially wrapped up in
the development of law and public administration.
During the colonial period the Western mind made a powerful and
enduring commitment to the concept that these two processes or
systems are fundamental to nation building. Gradually the West had
to recognize also a political aspect which involved popular participation and the creation of new loyalties to national symbols. In the face
of this emerging nationalism the West has, however, preserved the
belief that before expression should be given to popular politics a
people should have legal and administrative development. The
tenacity with which the West has clung to its historic concept of the
proper staging of the nation-building process is to be seen in the
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overriding importance given by American foreign aid to the development of administrative effectiveness in the new countries. Almost no
American aid goes to the direct development of political roles or the
machinery for popular politics. The overwhelming bulk of our aid is
directed to facilitating one or another administratively-supported
service or activity.
We have proceeded far enough with this general view of the developmental processes for the moment, and must put off any further
analysis of the interrelationships among these three elements of the
developmental process: law, administration, and popular politics. Let
us take instead a more penetrating look at the effects of law on social
development during the colonial period.
As we have suggested, the Western mind was groping for a modus
vivendi to carry on day-to-day relations with what it considered to be
exotic and bizarre cultures. The need was for some means of achieving
order and predictability in relations which seemed to be dangerously
tenuous; instinctively the realm of law seemed to provide a practical
solution. Above all, when disputes arose the Westerners felt a desperate need for institutions of mediation and adjudication which could be
trusted to adhere to universalistic principles (or at least principles that
the European felt to be universalistic according to his cultural bias).
Although there were other considerations, such as sentiments about
justice and morality, the practical concern about uncertainty and the
problem of managing disputes was a fundamental factor in the
Westerner's quest to establish his sense of law and order in the nonWestern world.
Leaving aside any questions of propriety, it is worth considering
whether the West was acting in a rational manner in relating ends to
means. Given the goal of conquering uncertainty and minimizing
the consequences of disputes, was the introduction of Westernized
legal systems an effective instrument? Historically, did the increased
establishment of Westernized legal codes and processes in fact reduce
uncertainty and disputes in the societies of Asia and Africa?
In any particular country the story was of course exceedingly
complex and, as in all massive historical processes, full of many contradictory occurrences. Yet a survey of this period suggests to me that
Westerners were on the wrong track, that their approach tended to
intensify the very problems they sought to resolve. It is, of course, a
commonplace to observe that man in solving one problem often creates
many others; but here is one of history's monumental examples of
man's determined capacity to stick to a single solution, and the more
it was pressed the more it aggravated the very problem it purported
to solve.
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I put the matter squarely to you: the more the Europeans insisted
upon Westernized legal systems the more uncertainty there was in
human relations and the more disputes there were which could not
be readily managed. In large measure Europeans could cling to their
singleminded approach by reassuring themselves that Asians and
Africans simply could not grasp the concept of Western law, and
hence needed more of it over a longer period of time. The dream was
that some day all would harmoniously abide together under a reign
of law and order; but in the meantime it was fortunate that the police
were a jolly fine lot who seemed to know how to handle troublemakers.
In spite of a widespread belief that Asians and Africans bad difficulties in adjusting to Westernized legal systems, I believe one could
develop quite a convincing case that in many, if not most, non-Western
societies the people responded quite readily to the introduction to
Westernized legal concepts and procedures. Indeed, in some cultures
the alacrity and enthusiasm of the response was nearly enough to
trample under foot the new legal system. For example, when the
British East India Company first established a system of courts in
Calcutta the exuberance of the Bengali reaction was so great as to
make one wonder if this was not a people with some deep, innate
affinity for the legalistic mind and spirit! The romance seems to have
continued to this day as the Bengali still seems capable of responding
with thrill and delight to the practices of the law. I assure you that
this is not just my subjective judgment, for the facts are that by 1900
one Bengali out of every seventy-four was engaged in some form of
litigation.' There are few cultures in history that have asked so much
of their courts.
The pattern was much the same elsewhere in the colonial world. In
the case of Java after the Western impact it appears that the rate of
litigation not only kept pace with but indeed exceeded the rate of
population growth. Economic growth, education, and all the other
indices of modernization could not keep up with the rise of Javanese
population which in time made the island one of the most densely
peopled places in the world. But strangely enough, the rate of litigation did keep pace, with the result that by the end of World War I
the island possibly had as dense a rate of litigation as anywhere else
in the world.
In Rangoon before World War II interest in the working of the law
took on a sporting quality. Asian business houses customarily set
aside each year surplus funds which were invested in energetic
searches for profitable lawsuits. Young solicitors were employed to
1. ZINKIN, AStA AND THE WEST 82 (1951).
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rack their brains and dream up ingenious suits, and older rogues with
scheming minds would, for a customary commission, assist in spotting
likely targets for such suits.
As another example of the way in which Westernized legal systems
produced effects precisely contrary to those intended, we could turn to
the area of property rights and the regulation of land titles. One of
the prime purposes of introducing codified legal concepts was to ensure
greater stability and order in social and economic relations. To the
European mind this meant that just as any society had to fall under a
single political jurisdiction so did each tract of land need to have its
own definite owner. To the European the prevalent Asian and African
practice of not defining precisely who owned what land was bound to
create confusion and instability in human relations. Yet a strange thing
happened: once colonial governments insisted, for both stability and
tax purposes, that clear titles be established for all cultivated lands,
extremely stable communities quickly broke down and, instead of
continuity and orderliness in the holding of property, land began to
change hands in a most chaotic and erratic fashion.
In traditional Burma, for example, families and villages had long
worked the land with little sense of precisely who owned it, and with
even less feeling that it might be possible to buy and sell real property
and to alienate in any sense the ancestral land. Under British rule,
however, these same people, once they learned that the holding of land
was no more secure than the possession of papers of title, rapidly
developed a most casual feeling about having and holding real
property. Exposed to the excitingly novel world of buying, selling,
and mortgaging property, and more particularly to the prospect that
one could fill his pockets with cash by merely putting up the title of
family lands as collateral, the Burmese soon lost their old and stable
habits and became so impersonally attached to their lands that they
readily allowed their plots to change hands two or three times a season
in the hopes of making some slight marginal profit. The result was
often such a confusion of transactions that the land record officers
could hardly keep pace. In short, instead of the law's encouraging
predictability and stable relations there was disorderly but extremely
vigorous change and transformation.
We could spend much time dwelling on the remarkably lively and
darkly ingenious ways in which Asians and Africans have demonstrated their interest in Western law. Unfortunately we must rush
right on to the moral of the story, which is that a process and a
method which had been introduced to help manage disputes seemed
to bring to life such a host of disputes that they soon became un-
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manageable. 2 In many cases the demands placed upon the courts were
impossibly heavy, procedures were consequently often compromised,
and in time petty forms of corruption became the only method left for
keeping the system together.
In short, until they were presented with Westernized methods of
adjudication, Asian societies had no idea of their potential for disputation. Communities and peoples who had lived side by side for generations suddenly seemed to discover within their relations all kinds of
issues calling for legal judgments. This increase in disputes stemmed
in part from the tensions produced by the Western impact itself. A
variety of social and economic changes-including, of course, the introduction of a Westernized legal system-disrupted the adjustment
mechanism in these traditional societies, thus causing the people to
become increasingly dependent upon one of the causes of their distress,
the novel legal system.
Needless to say, European authorities were perplexed by such
developments, and, reasoning that life had probably been more tranquil
under the rule of custom, colonial officials began in the first years of
this century to press for the revival and inclusion of customary law
in the handling of disputes. Once again I regret that our time is
limited, for it would be a pleasure to dwell upon the extraordinary
things which occurred when the Western mind sought to codify Asian
and African traditions. Probably the Dutch went furthest down this
road when, out of a strange mixture of a diffuse and uncontrollable
paternalism on the one hand and a rigidly precise and orderly outlook
on the other, they compulsively sought to record systematically and
make painfully explicit in numerous volumes the extremely subtle and
delicate nuances of traditional Indonesian Adat law. Having done very
little to make the Indonesians into Westerners, the Dutch amazingly
enough were still capable of worrying about whether their charges
understood their own traditions. The British were less orderly, less
systematic, but the pattern was not too dissimilar in their colonies. The
fact that bewigged Englishmen could sit enrobed in a tropical climate
and, with all earnestness and patience, seek to explain to natives the
essence of their own ancestral or tribal rules must have contributed in
some degree to the universal reputation that British culture was
singularly lacking in a sense of humor. According to British colonial
procedures, officials were expected to respect traditional customs and
practices except when they "violated universal canons of reason and
propriety." These limits, which were explicitly included in the legal
codes of most colonial territories, seem in the main to have been
2. For an excellent discussion of the way introduction of Western law encouraged
and channelized disputes in India, see Cohn, The Initial British Impact on India: A
Case Study of the Benares Region, 19 J. OF ASIAN STuDms 418-31 (1960).
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unnecessary, for by the time young British District Officers had
finished translating in their own minds the ancient traditions of
indigenous cultures they always emerged in a form which was consonant with English logic and English tastes.
If we put aside a fascination with anachronisms and return to our
main theme, we observe that European efforts to codify and make
explicit traditional legal principles inevitably stimulated disputes by
destroying the essential ingredients necessary for handling disputes
in most traditional systems. To greatly oversimplify the story, traditional cultures generally depended for the adjudication of disputes
upon the wit of the wise and judicious man who, in mediating and in
seeking compromise, needed the magic of ambiguous and even contradictory saws and principles. The Western approach, of course, was
to minimize reliance upon the cleverness of individual adjudicators
and mediators and to maximize the workings of a standardized and
impersonal process of decision making. The underlying assumption of
the Westernized and codified legal system was that all possible problems could be classified according to categories, that the examination
of the data would reveal which category was appropriate to the particular case or issue, and that, once category and data were so clarified,
a standardized process of reasoning and interpretation would bring
anyone versed in the ways of the law to the proper judgment. The
illusion here, of course, was that all possible categories of problems
could be initially defined to prevent the need for any ex post facto
judgments, and that the data or facts could "speak for themselves" in
the sense that once brought to light they would somehow automatically inform all under what category of the law they should be
properly classified.
The fallacies in these Western assumptions about the process of
adjudication were readily manifest once codified legal systems were
introduced into Asian and African societies. Clearly there was always
so much room for argument over the interpretation of both data and
categories that there could be little certainty about the probable outcome of disputes. At the same time disputes, instead of being snipped
out by wise men of authority at any early stage, were channelized by
the legal processes and in a sense brought out into the open.
III. Tm ENDURMN CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTRODUcTION OF
WESTERNIZED LEGAL SYSTEMS

We cannot here go into a detailed analysis of the wide range of
social, economic, and political consequences of the introduction of
Westernized legal systems into the traditional societies of Asia and
Africa. We must, however, note a few of these as we shift our attention
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from how Westernized law failed in its purpose of reducing uncertainty, managing disputes, and providing stability in social relations
during the colonial period, to the second part of our analysis which
deals with how, in the post-colonial period when the main interest has
been rapid changes, Westernized law has become a major stabilizing
factor inhibiting desired development.
The significance of the introduction. of Western legal systems is
best attested to by the fact that in most Asian and African societies the
most important new class to emerge under the colonial system was that
of the lawyers. In many colonies the whole concept of education was
tied to the aspiration of eventually receiving legal training. And in
almost all colonies the law was seen as the queen of professions. It
would be quite appropriate on this occasion when we are dedicating
a new building for legal training for me to elaborate in some detail
on what legal education meant to young Asians and Africans who were
becoming excited by the prospect of joining the modem world. There
is hardly a great man in those parts of the world who did not either
obtain a legal education or aspire to one.
It might seem rather impolitic of me to point out that most critics
of colonial practices have felt that the overproduction of lawyers in
many of these countries has been a long-run liability for national development. Certainly the existence of large numbers of unemployed
lawyers, full of unquenchable ambitions and with time on their hands,
free only to nurse their fantasies and to engage in scheming, has not
usually contributed to orderly and stable political life.
I do not intend it in any way to be an effort at humoring what I
assume to be the predisposition of my audience, when I suggest that
if there had to be an overproduction of any professional class it may
well have been best that it was lawyers. I will not take up your time
attempting to characterize the meritorious qualities of a legal education; I assume you know these better than I do. I only want to make
two points. First, of all the possible ways in which Asians and Africans
could have been introduced to the world of explicit and systematic
reasoning in relation to empirical fact-which is the essence of Western
science and philosophy-the avenue of legal training may have been
heuristically the most effective. Second, with respect to the dangers
of unemployed intellectuals, it seems to me that lawyers are the least
likely to be destructively radical in their frustrations, for, after all,
what is a lawyer without an orderly legal system? As revolutionary in
spirit as many Asian and African unemployed lawyers have been,
their craving for change has almost always stopped short of anything
which might compromise the continuing operation of systems essential
for the performance of the profession for which they were trained.
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The emergence of lawyers as the new elite in many Asian and
African countries meant that the diffusion of political awareness was
closely associated with a spreading interest in the workings of the
formal law. It would be hard to overstate the many ways in which
citizens in these colonial countries became knowledgeable in, and even
fascinated with, the workings of the law. Research would undoubtedly
reveal that these people have many very interesting ways of comprehending and understanding the nature of Westernized law.
For our purposes it is important only to note that this approach to
understanding government through an acquaintanceship with some
legal principles caused a profound confusion over the relationship of
form and substance in public affairs. Anxious to impress their colonial
subjects with the impersonal nature of justice and the firmness and
predictability of Westernized legal systems, the colonial authorities
stressed increasingly the majesty of the law, and the need for everything relating to the law to be carried out in the proper prescribed
fashion. Asians and Africans learned quickly that even if the slightest
error occurred in the procedures it could compromise the integrity of
the entire system. A single misplaced comma or an erased word could
alter the entire outcome of a case. In the light of this anxious and
apparently compulsive concern of Westerners for matters of form and
procedure it is not surprising that many Asians and Africans came to
believe that the power of the law lay in its rituals. We exaggerate only
slightly when we suggest that for significant numbers the almost
magical potency of the white man's laws lay entirely in carrying out
the right incantations. The sum effect was that in time deference to
law became associated with resisting all novel and unprecedented
decisions.
Similarly, the colonial experience instilled in many Asians and
Africans a belief that the law should be autonomous and subject to the
wishes of no man no matter how powerful. Colonial officials constantly
argued that they themselves were powerless before the law, and all
people were impressed by the fact that corruption occurred whenever
the law was bent to the desires of any individual. (Widespread
corruption often existed, and in no small measure precisely because of
this very attitude about the rigidity of law.) The difficulty was that in
the colonial setting there was no formal legislative process which could
serve as a balance to the judicial process. With no redress through
the possibility of legislative initiation, the people and even the important officials were helpless before the universal requirement of
adherence to the impersonal dictates of the law.
The result was that there was no sense of a need to connect the
operations of the judiciary with the needs of public policy. The law

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

seemed to have an independent existence, and no one learned how it
might be balanced with a legislative process which could open the
way to orderly change and innovation.
IV. THE BALANCE BETWEEN LAW, ADMINISTRATION, AND POLITICS
Time does not permit us to elaborate further on how the developing
feelings about the ritualistic character and the autonomous nature of
the law resulted in those Asians and Africans most committed to their
Westernized legal system becoming deterrents to rapid changes in the
post-colonial setting. One might be led to draw the conclusion from
this analysis that the great irony in these pages of history is that only
since the European left the scene have his concepts about the potential
influence of the law had their intended effects. Now what was to have
been one of the greatest benefits of Western man is often seen as a
curse to efficient and vigorous development.
I hope that this conclusion may give us some amusement, but I also
believe that there is a more important lesson to be derived from this
exercise in history. Have we not been observing that the heart of the
problem of change and stability in political societies is the interrelationship between law, administration, and popular participation?
During the colonial period we observed the limitations of the legal
system in either guiding change or maintaining stability. In the postcolonial era we noted that the efforts to preserve the autonomy of the
law put the system out of touch with the popular aspirations of the
people in their search for change and development.
Indeed, there is considerable danger that with the rise of popular
nationalism in many parts of Asia and Africa the principles of an
orderly legal system will become unduly identified with a past and
partly-hated period of colonial rule. Thus in time many of these
countries may turn against their heritage of Westernized laws. Whenever such extreme reactions do occur, we can expect further setbacks
in the process of developing a modern polity. The evidence from the
historic process through which Asia and Africa have been traveling
suggests that modernization and political development require a
delicate but firm and stable balancing of the three aspects of government which we have singled out in this analysis. Law by itself has
been inadequate in making modern nations, and even when law has
been reinforced by a system of administration, national development
has not automatically followed. The development of popular politics,
through which a people can give expression to their aspirations and
values, is the third essential ingredient of nation-building. However,
if popular politics should destroy the other two-law and administra-

1963]

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL UNREST

27

tion-then in another way the building of a modem polity will be
crippled if not destroyed.
The capstone of the process of modernization and political development thus seems to be an inescapable need for leadership which is
wise and tolerant but firm, and which, while appreciating the constructive potentialities and respecting the integrity of each of the three
ingredients, can also bring the three together in harmonious actions.
Does this conclusion not possibly have some bearing on the problems
of our highly advanced society? Are we too not always in need of that
kind of responsible leadership which is capable of respecting the
separate requirements for maintaining the vitality of the law, of
governmental administration, and of the political process, while at the
same time bridging the gap between them so that they may all three
work in harness for the public good?

